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Lancaster: Torts: Imputed Contributory Negligence Under the Dangerous Instru
CASE COMMENTS
mental declaration will be sufficient to define a public policy worthy
of tax sanctions? The instant case, retreating from the limitation
6
suggested by Lilly v. Commissionerthat the public policy be one de37
clared by statute, throws the matter into further doubt. Would
legislation of judicial origin be sufficient? Is it enough that there is
an appropriate declaration of public policy? In the instant case, for
example, one state had allowed 711 willful violations by the same
party during one year. Query: sharply defined?
The Tank Truck Rentals case and its companions are criticized
because their holdings appear to have been reached by the following
erroneous reasoning: (1) The Internal Revenue Code is a necessary
and appropriate implement to state law enforcement; (2) it is a more
detestable crime to unintentionallyviolate a statute exacting a penalty
in favor of the Government than to commit an intentional tort,
rectification of which is made to an individual; and, finally, (3) the
Commissioner is endowed with supernatural powers by which he can
determine when a "clear state policy" exists.
ANNE CAWTHON BooTH
RicHARD BRYAN BuRu

TORTS: IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE UNDER
THE DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE
Weber v. Porco, 100 So.2d 146 (Fla.1958)
Defendants, husband and wife, riding in the wife's automobile
driven by the husband, were injured in a collision with plaintiff's
automobile. Plaintiff's complaint, alleging negligence, was answered
by a denial and counterclaim for injuries to the wife and damages to
her automobile. Plaintiff's reply alleged that the husband's negligence barred the wife's recovery. Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on the counterclaim was granted. Defendants appealed.
HELD, under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine the driver's contributory negligence is imputed to the owner-passenger through the
54 HARV. L. RErv. 852 (1949).
36343 U.S. 90 (1952).
3
7See Schwartz, Business Expenses Contrary to Public Policy: An Evaluation of
the Lilly Case, 8 TAx L. REv. 241 (1953); 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 136 (1953).
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doctrine of respondeat superior. Reversed and remanded on other
grounds.
The seesaw battle between the concepts of vicarious liability and
contributory negligence has evoked considerable comment from leading authorities in the negligence field., Imputation of contributory
negligence was the triplet developed along with vicarious liability
and contributory negligence by the English courts during the industrial changes of the 19th century. Contributory negligence was
imputed to passengers in omnibuses2 and on ships3 as early as 1849.
A more usual application, however, barred recovery by the driver's
friends or family. 4
Although the courts have made use of the doctrines of vicarious
liability and contributory negligence both to extend and to curtail
liability under the "both-ways" test, 5 leading authors have conspicuously refused to justify doctrinally the imputation of contributory negligence, since it hinders compensation and seemingly serves
no useful purpose. 6 To replace contributory negligence, an influential
7
group convincingly advocates the adoption of comparative negligence.
The Florida Supreme Court has frequently allowed imputation
of contributory negligence through the doctrines of joint enterprise
and joint adventure," especially in the automobile accident field; but
the early English strict application has not been followed in this state.
'See Averbach, Comparative Negligence Legislation: A Cure for Our Congested
Courts, 19 ALBANY L. REv. 4 (1955); James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14

LA. L. REv. 340 (1954); Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence:
A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135 (1958); Prosser, Comparative Negli-

gence, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1953).
2Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (C.P. 1849).
3Cattlin v. Hills, 8 C.B. 123, 137 Eng. Rep. 455 (C.P. 1849). See also Lockart v.
Lichenthaler, 46 Pa. 151 (1863); Armstrong v. Lancashire & Y. Ry., L.R. 10 Ex. 47
(1875); Bridge v. Grand Junction Ry., 3 M. & W. 244, 150 Eng. Rep. 1134 (Ex.
1838).
4Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1878).
'Secured Fin. Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 207 Iowa 1105, 224 N.W. 88 (1929);
York v. Day's, Inc., 140 A.2d 730 (Me. 1958); Fisher v. International Ry., 112 Misc.
212, 182 N.Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1920); see Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis. L.
REv. 193 (1921).
6

See note 1 supra.
7Maloney, supra note 1; Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L.J. 195
(1954); Prosser, supra note 1. But see HARPER and JAMEs, TORTS §22.11 (1955), for
criticism (hampers placing loss on best risk-spreader).
SE.g., Caliando v. Huck, 84 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Fla. 1949); Union Bus Co. v.
Smith, 104 Fla. 569, 140 So. 631 (1932).
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For example, in Bessett v. Hackett the Court said that "the mere relationship of husband and wife does not constitute a sufficient basis
upon which to impute to the wife the negligence of the husband."9
Beginning with two leading cases decided in 1917 and 1920,10 the
Florida Supreme Court has proclaimed the automobile to be a "dangerous instrumentality."" This has enabled the Court, as a matter of
public policy, to extend vicarious liability in the automotive field to
2
effectuate the results obtained by statute in many other states.
Where the automobile owner's liability is controlled by statute,
the imputation of the driver's negligence to the owner has rested on
the construction of the statute. When the purpose of the statute is
construed to be that of placing financial liability on the owner for
the negligence of the driver, some courts have refused to impute the
driver's contributory negligence to the owner.13 The Iowa Supreme
Court, in construing the intent of Iowa's automobile owner's liability
statute, discarded the "two-way" doctrine as "an obvious non sequitur"
and allowed the owner to recover despite the contributory negligence
14
of the owner's driver.
Admittedly, the underlying motivation for the application of the
dangerous instrumentality rule is to establish the liability of a solvent defendant, not to deny the injured plaintiff a remedy.5 The
need for a financially responsible defendant has anything but diminished since the Southern Cotton Oil Co. cases were decided:6
Yet, by the perfunctory application of the "both-ways" test, the very
966 So.2d 694, 698 (Fla. 1953).
'0Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920); Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917).
"ISee Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268 (1947), which specifically
overrules White v. Holmes, 89 Fla. 251, 103 So. 623 (1925); Warner v. Goding, 91
Fla. 145, 107 So. 406 (1925); and Eppinger v. Trembly, 90 Fla. 145, 106 So. 879
(1925), in so far as they conflict with the Southern Cotton Oil Co. cases.
'2E.g., IowA CODE §321A93 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. §9.2101 (1957); R.I. GEN.
LAws §31-31-3 (1956).
'sSee Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949); Christensen v.
Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406, 147 A.L.R. 945 (1943);
Buckin v. Long Island R.R., 286 N.Y. 146, 36 N.E.2d 88 (1941). But see Milgate v.
Wraith, 19 Cal.2d 297, 121 P.2d 10 (1942); Di Leo v. Du Montier, 195 So. 74 (La.
App. 1940); Scheibe v. Lincoln, 223 Wis. 425, 271 N.W. 47 (1937).
'4Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 74 N.W.2d 212 (1956).
'SJames, supra note 1, at 351: "[T]his leads to the paradox that a rule which
departed from the common law in response to an urge towards wider liability is
being used to curtail liability by expanding the scope of the defense to it."

'OSee note 10 supra.
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